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Abstract
This paper outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the consociational power-
sharing approach and its presence in the political system of the post-Dayton Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. The power-sharing framework used in this study provides 
insights into the theory of consociationalism as a power-sharing approach and 
tries to contribute to our understanding of the presence and relevance of this 
model to the Bosnian political system. The consociational framework emphasises 
the role of the political elites in providing the political stability and economic 
prosperity in the heterogeneous societies. It has four main features: grand co-
alition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto. The 
functioning and performance of this model depends, to a large extent, on factors 
that are conducive to elite cooperation. These factors are: population size, bal-
ance of power among segments, multiparty system, segmental isolation, nature 
of social cleavages, overarching loyalties and tradition of elite accommodation. 
This paper shows that all features of consociationalism exist in the post-Dayton 
Bosnian political system. However, grand coalitions are always made after the 
elections and mainly for the distribution of positions in the executive bodies of 
state apparatus and without any strategic platform and goals to be achieved and 
accounted for, agreed in advance. Proportionality has been mainly replaced with 
the parity-giving rise to imbalanced representation in state institutions. Segmen-
tal autonomy has been misconceived and veto power has been used to block all 
legislation beneficial to the state. 
Keywords: power-sharing, consociationalism, political elites, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
Introduction
Classical theories of democracy noted that it is difficult and challenging task to 
found a stable democracy in heterogeneous and fragmented societies. It was as-
sumed that societal homogeneity and political consensus were the basis of po-
litical stability and the success of democracy. On the other hand, sharp social 
divisions and wide political disagreements in plural societies were seen as causes 
of instability. However, some comparative politics scholars have challenged this 
notion and have tried to show that it may be difficult to set up a stable democracy 
in societies with wide social cleavages, but it is not impossible to achieve politi-
cal stability in such societies through a proper elite accommodation and power-
sharing mechanism. Hence, the new political discourse that took place in the late 
1960s, put forth an argument which tried to plug a major gap in this debate, which 
had claimed that only conditions such as economic development, high literacy 
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racy. This new discourse was introduced by Arend Lijphart with his writings on 
the model of consociational power-sharing approach. 
It has been more than half a century since the first article was published on con-
sociationalism as a power-sharing approach, which is supposed to provide a 
political stability and economic development in heterogeneous societies. Since 
then, dozens of academic articles and books have been written on the theoretical 
foundation of consociationalism and its practical application and implications in 
many political systems all over the world. 
The main goal of consociationalism has been to transform societies which have 
been polarized along social cleavages such as race, ethnicity, religion, language 
etc., It was hoped that consociationalism would especially  societies that have 
come out from conflict, transforming them into the ones that might create condi-
tions conducive for the normal functioning of the state apparatus that will be able 
to provide more political stability and economic prosperity. 
Last year, the special winter issue of the Swiss Political Science Review was 
issued marking the occasion of the half a century on consociationalism. Eleven 
articles dedicated merely to the idea of consociationalism all over the world were 
included in this special issue.  Figure 1. shows that the total of 346 articles on 
consociationalism have been published since 19751. Although the idea of con-
sociationalism was introduced into political science in the late 1960s, the figure 
shows that almost 80% of articles have been published since 2000 (Bogaards, etc, 
2019). This indicates that political polarization has increased in the new millen-
nium and hence the need for a model such as consociationalism that might be able 
to provide more stability to such political systems and divided societies. Some 
scholars have identified quite a significant number of countries that have prac-
ticed a model of consociationalism either fully or partially. Thus, from few cases 
of consociational countries in 1970s, Taylor (2009a) has identified 39 countries, 
while Dixon (2018) found 44 countries that have features of consociationalism 
in their political arrangements. It is noticeable that most of the articles written on 
consociationalism since 2000, have used Northern Ireland, Lebanon and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as case studies.     
1 Unfortunately, the online data info does not exist before the year 1975 and hence some articles 
might have been omitted from this number.
85
*MIRSAD KARIĆ 
Consociationalism in the post-Dayton 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Figure 1. An overview of Journal articles on Consociationalism over time, 1975-2018
Source: Taken from Bogaards, Helms and Lijphart, 2019.
The main aim of this paper is to present the theoretical underpinnings of conso-
ciationalism as a power-sharing approach and its presence in the political system 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina2. 
Consociationalism as a Power-Sharing Approach
Consociationalism has been described as government by elite cartel. Elites, there-
fore, form the backbone of such a political system. Studies of political elites were 
developed in the early twentieth century as an alternative to the Marxist empha-
sis on class and economic forces as the most important factors in any society. 
The classic texts of elitist thought are considered to be those by Vilfredo Pareto 
(1935), Gaetano Mosca (1939), and Robert Michels (1968).  By the middle of 
the twentieth century, elite studies were further developed by scholars such as 
Lasswell and Lerner (1951), Wright Mills (1956) and Robert Dahl (1961). Ac-
cording to Lasswell (1936, 13), the study of politics is the study of influence and 
the influential… The influential are those who get the most of what there is to 
get… Those who get the most are elite; the rest are mass.  Therefore, all societ-
ies - socialist or capitalist, agricultural or industrial, traditional or advanced, are 
governed by political elites. The central assumption of elitism is that all societies 
are divided into two classes: the few who govern and the many who are governed. 
This premise that all humanity can be divided into two groups-the elite and the 
mass- finds its elaboration in the writings of Pareto and Mosca. 
Michels (1968, 15) stressed that elites not only exist but they are inevitable in 
any form of organisation. His study of the German Social Democrats led him to 
conclude that an “iron law of oligarchy” exists, which inevitably turns formal-
2 Officially, the state is called Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in English usage it is common 
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ly democratic organisations into undemocratic oligarchies. The elite approach, 
according to ‘Abdul Rashid Moten (2002, 13-14), has its roots among Muslim 
scholars such as Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Farabi (870-950), Abu al-Hasan al-
Mawardi (972-1058) and Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979). Al-Farabi 
(1993, 77) states that: 
There is someone who has more ability (qudrah) to deduce rules than others, while 
someone has more knowledge for effective guidance and teaching than others. Ac-
cordingly, those who have these abilities will lead those who lack them.
For Moten (2002, 13) those who can guide are known, in modern political science 
terminology, as the elite. Al-Mawardi, the Muslim jurist, talks about “the people 
of power and influence” who have the ability and authority “to make the choice” 
of those suitable for the Imamate. Furthermore, he mentions characteristics nec-
essary for Imam, explains the conditions required for elections and qualifications 
of ahl al-hall wa al-’aqd (those who loosen and bind-دقعلاو لحلا لهأ ) to elect the 
imam. Sayyid Abul ‘Ala Mawdudi believed that the essence of politics is to be 
determined by the nature and behaviour of political elites. According to Mawdudi 
(1984, 77), 
…factors which determine human advance or decline depend largely on the nature 
and the role of those who exercise control over the sources of power and direct the 
affairs of society… human civilization travels in the direction determined by the 
people who control the centres of power.
Thus, although Islam teaches that Sovereignty belongs only to almighty God and 
His messenger (S.A.W.) and that all people are equal before their Creator, still 
the Qur’an itself orders its followers to obey almighty God, the Messenger and 
those who are in authority among you (ulu-l-amri minkum-أولو األمر منكم) who are 
usually a small minority of the people.
Bosnia’s political system and power structures are based on the provisions of 
Annex 4 (“Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina”) of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment (DPA), which according to the former High Representative (HR), late Pad-
dy Ashdown, was a superb agreement to end a war but a very bad agreement to 
make a state (Ashdown, 2005). These constitutional arrangements set up a new 
arena for the elites to run their mutual relations in such a way that the dialogue 
between fighting parties has shifted from a battle-field into the legislative and 
executive branches of the government, which in the Bosnian context are found in 
the Parliamentary Assembly, the Presidency and the Council of Ministers.
1.1. Consociationalism and its Features
Political elites also hold power in Bosnia and make all of the important deci-
sions. Bosnia’s political system, which resulted from the DPA, is based on the 
premises of consociationalism: grand coalition, proportional representation, seg-
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mental autonomy and mutual veto. Consociational theory is primarily associated 
with Arend Lijphart (1968) whose works on the politics of accommodation are 
considered as milestones in the development of consociational democracy. There 
were others who preceded Lijphart, including Robert Dahl (1966), Val R. Lorwin 
and Frederick C. Engelmann (1966). Together, these works contain most of the 
principal elements of consociational theory. 
According to Lijphart, Lewis W. A. (1965) should be regarded as the first modern 
scholar to have analysed the consociational model. Lewis invented the conso-
ciational model: he deduced it from what he saw as the basic needs of deeply 
divided societies, but did not cite any empirical examples of consociationalism. 
According to Lijphart (1977, 31-41), consociational democracy has the following 
four characteristics:
1. Government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant 
segments of the plural society. This means that the government includes 
representatives from all relevant groups in society in the form either of a 
great coalition among the main parties, or of all-party government, or of 
temporary round tables. In each case it will be decisive to secure “the par-
ticipation by the leaders of all significant segments.”
2. The mutual veto which serves as an additional protection of vital minority 
interests. This means that each group has the opportunity to block politi-
cal decisions by using its veto rights. The primary aim of this is to foster 
consensus-building and the search for compromise. The right to veto can 
apply unrestrictedly to all decisions (absolute veto), it can be conditional 
and just refer to some basic laws, or it can just have a delaying effect in 
order to renegotiate disputed issues.    
3. Proportionality, which serves as  the principal standard of political rep-
resentation, civil service appointments and the allocation of public funds. 
All groups or segments are adequately represented in the executive, the 
legislative, the legal system and the public service. This can be assured 
through a quota system according to the size of the groups, the number of 
voters or a fixed ratio. In some cases, such as Bosnia, parity would be an 
option. Thus, Bosnia’s Presidency, the Parliament (upper house), Council 
of Ministers and Constitutional Court contain an equal number of repre-
sentatives from each ethnic group. Often, smaller groups are significantly 
over-represented to such an extent that they reach a level of equality with 
the majority or the largest group.      
4. A high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. 
Here, each group enjoys some degree of self-government; it maintains its 
own elected bodies, institutions and competencies. Therefore, few issues 
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this is organised on the basis of territorial arrangements. It implies that 
consociationalism will coincide with a federal-type structure that is char-
acterisedcharacterised by “a society in which each segment is territorially 
concentrated and separated from the other segments, or, to put it differ-
ently, a society in which the segmental cleavages coincide with regional 
cleavages.”
1.2. Behaviour of Political Elites
In consociationalism, the behaviour of political elites constitutes an important 
variable, both in the outbreak of conflict and in attempts to find solutions. The 
elites operate in structures of constraint and opportunity. Nordlinger (1972, 4) ar-
gued that: “Successful or unsuccessful regulation of ethnic conflict will be largely 
dependent on the purposeful behaviour of political elites.” The actions of elites 
are decisive in whether a conflict will continue or whether it is possible to reach 
some form of compromise. The elites are, however, not only important for the 
success or failure of conflict regulation, they may in turn have played an impor-
tant role in the outbreak of conflict. As Reilly (2001, 177) argues, there is increas-
ing evidence from many regions of “elite initiated conflict”. Therefore, elites can-
not necessarily be assumed to be more moderate than their followers (Horowitz, 
1985), and their interests in the conflict are likely to shape its development. Even 
if conflicts were initially elite initiated this does not mean that elites are uncon-
strained in their actions and their ability to compromise: they can be constrained 
by their followers, by competing elites within their own ethnic group as well as 
by the interplay with the elites of the opposing ethnic group(s) (Caspersen, 2003). 
Theories on the timing of conflict regulation are, not surprisingly, mostly fo-
cused on the relations between the groups in the conflict. They focus on concepts 
such as the “ripe moment”, “mutually hurting stalemate”, and “security dilemma” 
(Zartman, 1996 and Barry 1993). The key to bringing a conflict to an end, accord-
ing to these accounts, is that a willingness to accept compromise is found simul-
taneously in both groups. This is primarily an effect of the interplay between the 
groups and possibly of international intervention to ease the security dilemma. 
The development of a conflict is not only influenced by the relations between 
groups: a stalemate can last for years and a conflict can take a different course 
without the inter-group relations being the driving force. The dynamics within the 
ethnic groups, between the elites, their followers and competing elites, are also 
of importance because elites will see an interest in pursuing an accommodating 
strategy and be able to follow these inclinations (Caspersen, 2003, 105-6). As 
Horowitz (1985, 574) argues, elites in ethnic conflicts cannot be expected to be 
monolithic: intra-ethnic competition is the norm and this will severely constrain 
elites. In addition, given such competition, it will under some circumstances be 
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strategically valuable for elites to pursue more antagonistic strategies in order to 
gain an advantage in the intra-ethnic competition. 
Therefore, elite behaviour and elite positions in ethnic conflicts do not only re-
flect selfish interests, since the elites will be constrained by other factors, and in 
order to analyse this the focus should be on both relations between the groups 
and dynamic within the groups. The behaviour of political elites, in terms of 
cooperation and confrontation, can result in the political system being stable and 
producing development or unstable, resulting in decay. This is depicted clearly in 
graph 1, which shows the dependency of a system’s stability on the cooperative 
behaviour of political elites, which in return is a result of certain factors such as 
population size, balance of power among segments, a multiparty system, seg-
mental isolation, nature of social cleavages, overarching loyalties and tradition 
of elite accommodation.
Graph 1. Relationship between conducive conditions, Elite behaviour and the 
performance of the system
The relationship between the behaviour of political elites and political stability, 
is one of the central questions in political science and political sociology. Some 
political scientists go to the extent of saying that “…the central concern of politi-
cal science is competition for and the exercise of leadership by various elites…” 
(Edinger and Searing, 1967, 429). There is a theoretical agreement among the 
political scientists who link these two variables, namely, political stability and 
elite behaviour. Thus, Lijphart (1968) argues that Dutch democratic stability is 
due to cooperation and “accommodation” within an elite circle, a thesis which 
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The leaders of rival subcultures may engage in competitive political behaviour 
and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may 
also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing ef-
fects of cultural fragmentation (Almond, 1956). 
As Claude Ake (1967, 113) stated, as a result of such overarching cooperation 
at the elite level, a country can “achieve a degree of political stability quite out 
of proportion to its social homogeneity.” Moreover, this possibility does not ex-
ist only in the fragmented democracies, but also in fragmented pre-democratic 
or non-democratic systems as well (Lijphart, 1968). Thus, consociational politi-
cal systems are those that are plural but democratically stable due to coalescent 
behaviour on the part of the political elite. Allowing ‘the co-existence of strong 
sub-cultural division with democratic stability’ consociationalism places respon-
sibility on the elite to remove competition and contention from the political arena 
(Daalder, 1974).
Since elite cooperation is the principal characteristic of successful conflict man-
agement in deeply divided societies, consociationalists suggest that even if there 
are deep communal differences, overarching integrative elite cooperation is a nec-
essary and sufficient condition to bring democratic stability to culturally fragment-
ed societies (Kenneth, 1974). Eric Nordlinger (1972) goes as far as arguing that 
elites “alone can initiate, work out and implement conflict-regulating practices, 
therefore, they alone can make direct and positive contribution to conflict-regu-
lating outcomes.” In the consociational approach, elites or group leaders, directly 
represent various societal segments and act to form political ties at the centre. 
The essential conceptual tools for the explanation of stability in fragmented so-
cieties are compromise, bargaining, accommodation, coalition and alliance. In 
short, Lijphart (1971, 9) claims that stability in a segmented society is said to be 
the result of the “co-operative efforts” of subcultural elites “to counteract the cen-
trifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation”. He consistently asserts that conso-
ciationalism is the only viable option for democracy in divided societies: 
“For many of the plural societies of the non-Western world, therefore, the realis-
tic choice is not between the British model of democracy and the consociational 
model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all.” (Lijphart, 
1968, 238)
Consociationalism, according to Lijphart, is the only democratic model that en-
sures political stability in ethnically fragmented societies. This implies that the 
political solution to ethnic conflicts lies in the development of a consociational 
framework. Countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria in Europe and 
Lebanon and Malaysia in Asia - although characterised by ethnic, religious, cul-
tural and linguistic cleavages - have been able to maintain stable democratic re-
gimes. The crucial factor in the maintenance of their stability is that political 
91
*MIRSAD KARIĆ 
Consociationalism in the post-Dayton 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
leaders, aware of the fact that fragmentation can result in instability, deliberately 
adopt accommodative politics to oppose this possibility.  
1.3. Favourable Conditions for Consociational Democracy
The hypothesis, which links political stability/instability and elite cooperation/
confrontation, raises a new question. What are the conditions that influence the 
cooperative or confrontative behaviour of political elites? Obviously for success-
ful power-sharing, some favourable conditions have to exist. The question of 
which factors might foster cooperation and power-sharing has long been debated 
among political scientists (Jurg, 1974).  
Consociational democracy requires the cooperation of segmental leaders in spite 
of the deep cleavages separating the segments. This requires that the leaders feel 
at least some commitment to the maintenance of the unity of the country as well 
as a commitment to democratic practices. They must also have a basic willing-
ness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of other segments in a spirit 
of moderation and compromise. At the same time, political elites must be able to 
keep the support and loyalty of their own supporters. Based on this, it is neces-
sary for the political elites to strike a balance between the compromise, which 
is supposed to be the source of all crucial decisions made by the elites, and the 
immediate interests of the elites’ followers. In this context, political elites face 
two major tasks: first, it is of crucial importance to see the extent to which party 
leaders are more tolerant than their followers and second, to the extent to which 
political elites are able to carry them (their followers/masses) along. Therefore, 
the role of leadership is clearly a crucial element in consociational democracy. 
However, due to the fact that the behavior of the political elite is liable to change, 
it is necessary to identify the conditions that are conducive to overarching elite 
cooperation and stable non-elite support. For this purpose, the conditions can be 
divided as having structure-oriented and actor-oriented factors. Structure-orient-
ed factors are mainly concerned with existing or non-existing structures (such 
as size, economic matters, territorial borders or the shape of the party system), 
while actor-oriented factors are concerned with the behaviour, the constraints and 
perceptions of actors. Therefore, the following factors appear to be particularly 
important, but not exhaustive: multiple balance of power or relative equilibrium, 
multiparty system, segmental isolation (Federalism) and cross-cutting cleavages 
(Lijphart 1968 and Schneckener, 2002).  
It is important to emphasise however, that the favourable conditions are “helpful 
but neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the 
success of consociational democracy”(Lijphart 1968, 54). Hence, in the absence 
of these conditions, consociationalism, although perhaps difficult, should not be 
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ditions for consociationalism have not been derived at deductively but induc-
tively after a number of comparative studies of consociational systems have been 
conducted. Therefore, due to the considerable spread of the consociational model, 
the favourable conditions have undergone significant modification in number and 
substance over time. The following paragraphs provide the number of favourable 
conditions presented mainly by Arend Lijphart at different times. 
1.3.1. Population Size
A salient characteristic of the original cases of European consociational democra-
cies, namely the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria, is that they have 
small population sizes. According to Lijphart (1968, 64 and 1985, 123) 
“…..population small size directly enhances a spirit of cooperativeness and ac-
commodation and it indirectly increases chances of consociational democracy by 
reducing the burdens of decision-making and thus rendering the country easier 
to govern….elites are more likely to know each other personally and to meet of-
ten, decision making process is less complex and such countries generally do not 
conduct a very active foreign policy; this increases the probability that they will 
not regard politics as a zero-sum game and hence that they will chose coalescent 
instead of adversarial styles of decision-making.”
Similar to this, on the role of size in the functioning of consociational democracy 
Jurg Steiner (1971, 65) states that: “In smaller states, the political elites are, com-
pared to bigger states, relatively small. Hence the probability is greater that the 
members of the political elite will interact relatively frequently.” However, the 
effect of small size on the possibilities of consociational democracy is not linear. 
Namely, when a country is very small, its reservoir of political talent will also be 
quite small. Because consociational democracy requires an exceptionally able 
and prudent leadership, smallness is a favourable factor only to a certain limit. 
Finally, small countries do not conduct very active foreign policy and political 
elites are not forced to make decisions that may jeopardise cooperation and con-
sensus among them.                       
1.3.2. Balancing Power
Multiple balances of power between the segments of a heterogonous society, such 
as Bosnia, are more conducive to a consociational model of democracy’s suc-
cessful functioning than a dual balance of power, or a hegemony by one of the 
segments, because if one segment has a clear majority, its leaders may attempt to 
dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority. Thus, two party systems 
or one dominant party systems usually generate severe tensions and tend to create 
unstable systems. On the other hand, the success of the consociational power-
sharing approach has mainly been attributed to the minority status of all subcul-
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tures in the society. Based on this, Daalder (1966, 219) states that: “The divisive 
effects of segmentation are softened by the circumstance that none of the subcul-
tures has much chance of acquiring an independent majority.” The “power” that 
may or may not be in equilibrium here primarily means the numerical strength of 
the segments, which in a democracy with free and fair elections can be expressed 
as electoral strength and translated into parliamentary seats. 
The notion of a multiple balance of power, according to Lijphart (1968), contains 
two separate elements: (1) a balance, or an approximate equilibrium, among the 
segments, and (2) the presence of at least three different segments. Together these 
two elements mean that all segments are minorities. In fact, a society with rela-
tively few segments, three or four, constitutes a more favourable base for conso-
ciational democracy than one with relatively few segments. In his work on South 
Africa, Lijphart (1985) proposed three to five segments. However, it has to be 
borne in mind that only a society, which is characterised by these two ‘element-
balances’ and at least three different segments, is conducive to consociational 
democracy. Lijphart (1968, 56) stressed that ‘cooperation among groups becomes 
more difficult as the number of participating in negotiations increases’.
Qualitative crisis of political participation might be one of the obstacles to con-
sociationalism’s ability to yield results,  especially if the demands of one group 
tend to be made at the expense of another. In this case, the ’centre’, which refers 
to the “grand coalition”, must have some flexibility and can sometimes grant 
the demands of one group without necessarily injuring the interests of others 
(Horowitz, 1971). The centre must be able to act with impartiality, especially in 
dealing with sensitive issues, in order to improve its effectiveness and gain more 
legitimacy among followers. However, participation of many segments in the 
negotiations and decision-making process might be an impediment to the smooth 
function of the system. Taking into consideration variables such as the number of 
segments, size of the largest segment and relative sizes of segments, it might be 
stated that in the Bosnian society neither of the groups has an absolute majority 
and that there is an imbalance among the segments with regards to the segments’ 
size. The index of fragmentation in Bosnia, using these three variables, is 0.64. 
This indicates that Bosnian society is quite imbalanced and fragmented along 
ethnic lines and, after Spain, is the second most fragmented society in Europe 
(Drazanova, 2019).
1.3.3. Multiparty Systems
The term ‘party system’ refers mainly to the number of political parties within a 
country and their ideological orientations. In discussing issues relating to the the 
total number of political parties that participate in the political system, political 
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nant party system’, the ’two-party system’, the ‘two-plus party system’ and ‘mul-
tiparty system’. Plural societies with a multiparty system are characterised by 
the fact that political parties are organised along the social cleavages that prevail 
in such societies, which is considered a favourable condition for consociational 
democracy. In such circumstances, members of political parties represent the re-
spective segments of the society. Consequently, multipartism with relatively few 
political parties is optimal for the success of consociational democracy in a plural 
society, under the condition that all parties are minority parties and no party has a 
capacity to win majority of the seats in the parliament and create the government. 
In order to provide a clearer classification and typology of party systems, Sara-
tori (1976) divides the multiparty system into moderate and extreme multiparty 
systems. He defines a moderate multiparty system as one in which the number of 
the relevant parties capable of making a coalition and governing the country is 
three, four or at most five. This type of the party system brings about a centripetal 
political system with quite high level of political stability and good economic 
performance. On the other hand, extreme multiparty systems are characterised by 
large number of ideologically diverse parties with differing visions and missions, 
of which Bosnia might be given as an example, are conducive to governmental 
deadlock and paralysis.  
1.3.4. Segmental Isolation
Clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage 
of limiting mutual contacts and, consequently, of limiting the chances that ev-
er-present potentially violent antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility. Quincy 
Wright (1951, 196) argues that “ideologies accepted by different groups within a 
society may be inconsistent without creating tension.” The danger of great ten-
sion arises only when these groups “are in close contact.” As Lorwin (1966, 187) 
argues “If meaningful personal contacts with people of other subcultures are few, 
so are the occasions for personal hostility.”
A plural society tends to be organised along segmental cleavages and these sepa-
rate organisations necessitate a degree of segmental isolation that is conducive to 
consociational democracy. On the other hand, the consociational method of seg-
mental autonomy. To a large extent, furthers the development of organisational 
networks within each segment. As a result of this, consociationalism increases 
the degree of separateness by applying segmental autonomy of a territorial kind 
along geographical lines (Lijphart, 1968). One institutional mechanism intended 
to mitigate and ease such constraints is ethno-federalism, which refers to a federal 
political system in which  the governance of specific territorial units are inten-
tionally associated with specific ethnic categories (Hale, 2004). 
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The primary aim of ethno-federalism is to preserve ethnically divided states by 
satisfying demands for autonomy on key issues, localising potential conflicts, 
promoting unifying identities and reducing opportunities for the central govern-
ment to exploit minority regions (Bermeo, 2002 and Kohli, 1997). According to 
Riker (1964), for a country to be federal it must possess the following two ele-
ments.  First, it must have a “federal constitution and characterised by (1) the two 
levels of government that rule the same land and people; (2) each level has at least 
one area of action in which it is autonomous and (3) there is some guarantee (even 
though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each govern-
ment in its own sphere.” Second, it must have at least the minimum level of de-
mocracy needed, such that the concept of regional autonomy has some meaning. 
1.3.5. The Nature and Characteristics of Social Cleavages
The nature and characteristics of social cleavages is one of the factors that might 
make elite cooperation more conducive. Plural society is characterised by the 
presence of two or more separate communities living side by side. This type of 
society creates cleavages that usually translates into political parties representing 
a constituent people of that particular society. However, some conditions have to 
be met in order for a social grouping to be called a cleavage. Firstly, latent socio-
logical cleavages must exist as they create potential for politicised and patricised 
cleavages. These cleavages are determined by the level of heterogeneity of the 
society and are based on factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, linguistic frag-
mentation, class etc.  Second, people on one side of the cleavage must be aware 
of their common identity and must be willing to act on that basis to protect and 
promote the interests associated with their social identity. Finally, a cleavage be-
comes conflict-prone in organised society, i.e., if there is an institution that can 
provide an organised support and benefit to those who are on a particular side of 
the social divide (Lipset and Stein, 1967).      
Ethnicity as a social cleavage and source of difference in a society is not a primor-
dial quality. Ethnicity is not innate, it is not essentially ‘given’. Rather, ethnicity 
is socially constructed, it is an abstraction, a fluid ideological notion that does 
not exist outside of the mind. And as such plural societies divided along ethnic 
lines suffer from fragmented political culture that ultimately leads to immobilism 
and instability. Most scholars suggest that the stakes in conflicts characterised by 
identity issues are less amenable to compromise and accommodation than those 
conflicts centred on politico-economic issues. These analysts maintain that settle-
ments of wars involving identity issues are less likely to prove stable than those 
designed to end politico-economic wars, because the security concerns associated 
with identity wars are typically more intense than those stemming from the latter 
type of conflict and this limits the potential for cooperation. Politico-economic 
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munal groups (Barry, 1975). According to Nordlinger (1975), “Communal cleav-
ages are likely to be more salient and more intractable than class conflicts, more 
difficult to manage and more likely to provoke violence not only in emerging 
states but in many older polities”. 
1.3.6. Overarching Loyalties
Overarching loyalties to the state and state institutions might mitigate the de-
gree of conflict that results from the existing cleavages in a society. Therefore, 
cleavages and loyalties as divisive and cohesive factors respectively, may func-
tion simultaneously and the effect depends on the relationship between the two. 
Lijphart (1968) states that the interaction of cleavages and overarching loyalties 
determines the number and nature of the segments in a plural society. He claims 
that overarching loyalties produce cohesion for the entire society or for particular 
segments of the society. However, the final goal should be a creation of common 
interests among the elected political elites who will set up the example to the seg-
ments of the society they represent whereby national loyalty gradually replaces 
loyalty to the constituent units of the society.       
Overarching loyalties are even more important if they provide cohesion for the 
whole society and thus moderate the intensities of all cleavages simultaneously. 
State nationalism might play a decisive and cohesive role. Two factors related to 
nationalism are of crucial importance here. First, the strength of nationalism, i.e. 
to what extent the sense of nationalism is strong enough to bring together people 
of different backgrounds to have  the same feelings towards the state and second, 
even more importantly, is the question of whether it truly unites the society or 
instead acts as an additional cleavage by encouragin loyalty to a particular ethnic 
group among other ethnicities that exist in the society. As a result of this and 
according to Wenfan and Gaochao (2010), there are four possible outcomes of 
ethnic and national loyalties in a given society:
1. Weak ethnic loyalty and weak national loyalty, implying a possible co-
erced ethnic integration, but some degree of political stability due to the 
lack of desire for ethnic independence;
2. Weak ethnic loyalty and strong national loyalty, suggesting successful in-
tegration and political stability due to the desire to stay together;
3. Strong ethnic loyalty and weak national loyalty, most likely a result of 
failed integration and a condition for political instability;
4. Strong ethnic loyalty and strong national loyalty, implying successful but 
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Table 1.: Loyalty Types
Hypothetical outcomes of ethnic and national loyalties
Weak ethnic loyalty Strong ethnic loyalty








The levels of identification of the ethnic and national loyalties among the three 
main ethnic groups in Bosnia will obviously have important policy implications 
in how to handle ethnic relations and provide political stability in the future by 
avoiding tensions and conflict. 
1.3.7. Traditions of Elite Compromise and Accommodation
Heterogeneous societies normally enjoy politically stable governments and eco-
nomic development, if the elected political elites are able to compromise and 
engage in friendly rather than antagonistic decision-making process. For politi-
cal elites to be moderate and cooperative,  prior existence of a tradition of elite 
compromise and accommodation is essential. Therefore, it is vital that a tradition 
of pluralism and political accommodation by political elites precede the process 
of political modernisation and nation-building. A pre-democratic historical ten-
dency towards moderation and compromise can indeed be an independent factor 
that appreciably strengthens the chance of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 
1968, 99-103). An a priori tradition of elite compromise and accommodation is a 
favourable factor for consociational democracy but  although it may be of great-
er importance than other factors, it is not a prerequisite for the consociational 
power-sharing approach to take place. Consociationalism has been described as a 
government by elite cartel whose main goal is to provide a political stability and 
economic development to the nation. It is, therefore, necessary to define concepts 
such as elite and political stability.
Consociationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The major argument underpinning the consociational power-sharing model, is 
that in a society divided and fragmented along ethnic and religious lines, elite 
cooperation is the major basis for political stability and economic development. 
Support for this hypothesis comes from numerous empirical studies such as that 
of the Netherlands, Belgium, Malaysia and Austria. This cooperative behaviour 
covers a number of political strategies including: grand coalition, proportional 
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1.1. The Nature of the post-Dayton Coalitions
According to its Constitution, Bosnia consists of two entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 1995, article 1.3). Power-sharing is the essence of the Bosnian Con-
stitution and its primary objective was the decentralisation of political power and 
the provision of security to the three ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, 
in order that their vital national interests would be protected. As with regard to 
the primary institutions of executive power, no power sharing arrangement would 
be complete without broad group representation at a governmental level. Govern-
ments require co-operation, usually being formed among the political parties that 
win the majority of votes within each ethnic group, without a joint (pre- or post-
electoral) platform however,. The willingness to form coalitions of joint-decision 
making and inclusion, requires the consent of the major parties participating in 
government formation. Grand coalitions are extremely difficult when each group 
is represented by only one dominant party, or other parties are weak to the extent 
that they cannot get reasonable number of seats in the parliament. This results in 
limited variations of coalitions. 
The designers of the DPA recognised the importance of elections in the post con-
flict peace-building process. As Gofman and Lijphart (1986, 2) clarified, the elec-
tion process is considerably influenced by the rules, which govern it: “…election 
rules not only have important effects on other elements of the political systems, 
especially the party system, but also offer a practical instrument for political en-
gineers who want to make changes in the political system.” Electoral engineering 
and the setting of rules guiding elections are widely considered as crucial aspects 
of institutional design in divided societies. These rules determine how various 
ethnic groups are represented, what behaviour by political elites is deemed ac-
ceptable within the given society and provide for the accountability of politicians 
(Reilly and Reynolds, 1999). As a result of these electoral provisions, the political 
system of Bosnia is characterised by the notion of proportionality and parity in 
the leading state legislative and executive bodies such as the Parliamentary As-
sembly, the Presidency and the Council of Ministers.
1.2. Proportional Representation vs. Parity in Representation
Based on the accommodation and compromise reached at the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA), the Constitution tries to accommodate the demands of all three 
ethnic groups and the political elites that represent them (in equal numbers of rep-
resentatives) in the Presidency, Council of Ministers, and the House of Peoples 
and (somehow) in the House of Representatives. Thus, the Constitution adopted 
the principle of parity of representation at various levels of authority, securing all 
ethnic groups, regardless of their representation in the society and equal power 
in the decision- making process. It is further strengthened by the mechanism of 
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rotating chairmanships of the Presidency and both houses of the Parliamentary 
Assembly every eight months. This happens alongside an  agreed rule among the 
political elites to rotate position of chairman of the Council of Ministers among 
the three ethnic groups after each parliamentary election. 
The essence of the principle of proportionality and of cooperative behaviour for 
that matter is that elites recognise the fragmented nature of the society and at-
tempt, through various policies and actions, to perform a difficult balancing act. 
Therefore, a proportional system of political representation is supposed “to guar-
antee for the fair representation of ethnic minorities” (Lijphart, 1985, 495). On 
the basis of the observation of Bosnia, one can distinguish two different meanings 
of proportionality. The first meaning would be a classical understanding of pro-
portionality, that is, every citizen with the right to vote would be represented in 
a parliament and other state bodies. The state institutions, first and foremost the 
parliament, would reflect the results of the citizens’ votes. The second meaning is 
the proportional representation of ethnic groups, rather than citizens, in a state.
As with the parliament, every ethnic group has a third of the seats (five) in the 
upper house of the Parliament no matter how big the ethnic groups actually are. 
One third of the House of Representatives is reserved for the deputies coming 
from the RS and the other two-thirds are reserved to the deputies elected from 
the FBH. The number of citizens belonging to an ethnic group has not been of 
relevance for the way the seats in the Parliament are distributed. In this way the 
representation within Bosnian state institutions has been a reflection of the ethnic 
composition of the country.
Thus, proportionality in the Bosnian context has been used only in terms of the 
distribution of the influence on the decision-making process and country gover-
nance among the three ethnic groups. One of the consequences of proportionality 
related to ethnic groups, in the Bosnian context, is the lack or even total absence 
of representation of those citizens who do not belong to any group, so called Oth-
ers. In the last census held in 2013, 3.7% the Bosnian population declared them-
selves as Others and belonged to neither of the three major groups. Although it 
was very difficult to complete the indexing of citizens because of a large number 
of refugees, and internally and externally displaced persons, one could assume 
that there was still a large group of people whose interests, because of the fact 
of their not belonging to any of the major groups, were not represented in state 
institutions (Pajić, 1998). Suggesting possible options for counterbalancing the 
presence of a majority ethnic group, Lijphart says that a bigger group could be 
underrepresented while minor group(s) could be given more places in a parlia-
ment than it should on the basis of its size alone:
For instance, a group comprising eighty percent of the population might be given 
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in the cabinet or even, in the case of parity, only fifty percent; and the representa-
tion of the minority or minorities would be increased correspondingly. (Lijphart, 
1985, 500-1)
In consociational practice, division of places, ministerial posts and parliamentary 
seats is related to the size of an ethnic group. In Bosnia, however, despite the 
imbalance in the size of groups, the quantitative difference between them did not 
find an acknowledgment in the composition of the state institutions: the posts go 
equally to every group, no matter how big they are. Hence, the number of cabinet 
ministers in the Council of Ministers needs to be divided by three so that each 
constituent people will have an equal number of ministers regardless of their 
proportion in the population. Therefore, instead of the rule of proportionality, 
again the rule of parity predominated in the Council of Ministers, promoting the 
concept of positive discrimination.
1.3. Segmental Autonomy
With regard to the autonomy of groups, Lijphart, proposes that issues that are 
of common concern should be decided at the state level. In this case, decisions 
should be made jointly by different groups. Other matters should be left for deci-
sion by each separate group. At the heart of this multi-ethnic policy was the de-
centralization of political power and the provision of security to all ethnic groups. 
The promise of the DPA was that the power of majorities at higher levels of gov-
ernment would be closely regulated, and where possible, power was to be shared 
through being devolved downwards, thereby allowing greater self-government at 
local level. 
The central constitutional point of this new multi-ethnic state was that Bosnia 
consists of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), es-
tablished by the Washington Agreement in March 1994, occupying 51 percent 
of the territory and the entity Republika Srpska (RS), occupying the remaining 
49 percent. The FBiH consists of ten cantons3, each of which is a governmental 
entity with a high degree of autonomy. Each canton has its own government, 
headed by a Premier who has his/her own cabinet, and is assisted in his/her duties 
by various regional ministries, agencies and canton services. Cantons have their 
own parliaments whose representatives are directly elected in general elections.
The responsibilities of the state and entity institutions are outlined in Article III 
of the Bosnian Constitution. Thus, institutions of the Bosnian state were to be 
3 Five cantons (Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje, and Sarajevo) are Bosniak ma-
jority cantons, three (Posavina, West Herzegovina, and West Bosnia) are Croat majority cantons, 
and in two cantons (Central Bosnia and Herzegovina and Neretva canton) neither ethnic group 
has predominant majority. These cantons are ‘ethnically mixed’ and exercise special legislative 
procedures for protection of the constituent ethnic groups.
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responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary 
policy, the finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of the 
country, immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation, international 
and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol, es-
tablishment and operation of common and international communications facili-
ties, regulation of inter-entity transportation and air traffic control (DPA, Annex 
4, article 3.1.) 
The entities are responsible for ‘all governmental functions and powers not ex-
pressly assigned in the Constitution’, for example, law enforcement, social policy 
and education. The entities also ‘have the right to establish special parallel rela-
tionships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Bosnia’. In order to safeguard the interests of the three groups, the 
central state institutions have been organised on the basis of an ethnic key, which 
guaranteed representation to all three sides and the protection of ‘vital interest’. 
It is important to mention that the Constitution (Article 3.5.) provides for the 
State to assume other responsibilities for such matters which are necessary to 
preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and inter-
national personality of Bosnia4 in accordance with the division of responsibilities 
between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitution ensures 
that additional institutions may be established as necessary to carry out such 
responsibilities.
The cantons in the FBiH were to be responsible for all functions not expressly 
granted to the FBiH entity Government. Therefore, they have been, in particular, 
responsible for police forces, education, cultural policy, housing, public service, 
land use, local business, charitable activities, cantonal tourism and social welfare 
policy and services. Beside this, some functions such as guaranteeing and enforc-
ing human rights, health, environmental policy, implementing laws and regu-
lations concerning citizenship and use of natural resources are shared by both, 
Federation and canton governments.
On the other hand, the entity RS is higly centralised entity with the President, 
Cabinet and Parliament on the top of executive and legislative authorities and 
municipalities at the local level and as such does not have the same structural 
problems as the FBiH.
The creation of ethnically homogenous territories was the result of the massive 
displacement of people, ethnic cleansing and genocide. When the international 
community created the new constitutional framework for Bosnia, the idea be-
hind it was that: ‘giving political autonomy to territorially defined ethnic groups 
would lead to constructive dialogue and peaceful management of the conflict’ 
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(Bojić-Dželilović, 2003, 289). According to Lijphart, keeping the different seg-
ments apart limits their mutual contact and subsequently lessens the probability 
of antagonism and open hostility. Lijphart admits that segmental autonomy con-
tradicts the widely held assumption that mutual contacts foster mutual under-
standing, but states that:
‘It is in the nature of consociational democracy, at least initially, to make plural so-
cieties more thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental 
cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into construc-
tive elements of stable democracy’ (Lijphart, 1968, 42).
By explicitly recognising the segments, a consociational democracy will increase 
its organisational strength and this strength will, instead of creating conflict, open 
up a possibility for the elite to play a constructive role in conflict resolution (Li-
jphart, 1985, 106 and 2004, 45). The critics of consociationalism point at the 
probability that segmental autonomy might lead to representation of ethnic iden-
tity and absolute secession (Barry, 1975, 39). On the contrary, Ibrahimagić (2019) 
found that Bosnia, since its creation, was never a tribal state, nor was it within its 
administrative division, divided according to religious or ethnic affiliation even 
before Dayton, advocates the abolition of a mono-ethnic, entity organisation in 
the internal administrative-political organisation of Bosnia into two multi-ethnic 
entities and advocates the federalisation of all of Bosnia into 14 cantons, with a 
single president of the State, with Sarajevo in its pre-war boundaries as the capital 
of the State and the Brčko District of Bosnia. 
1.4. Mutual Veto
The idea of protecting the rights of the various ethnic groups from being over-
ruled by a majority has been a dominant theme in Bosnia. With the minority veto 
that is proposed by Lijphart and which is also incorporated into the Bosnian po-
litical system, every single ethnic group represented in the institutions of a state 
can defend its vital national interests if the issue at stake endangers them. As a 
result of the minority veto no decision can be taken against the interest of any 
constituent people. If the majority of either Bosniak, Croat or Serb delegates in 
the House of Peoples, declares that a proposed decision or law of the Parliamen-
tary Assembly is destructive to a vital national interest of their people then that 
decision or law cannot be adopted. Thus, the majority (three) of Bosniak, Serb 
and Croat delegates have to vote for the decision in order to be adopted in the up-
per house. This may seem rather ridiculous given that out of fifteen delegates in 
the House of Peoples. A mere three of them can veto any decision or law that they 
consider to be against the interest of the people they represent there. Otherwise, 
a conciliation procedure is foreseen and ultimately a decision is taken by the 
Constitutional Court. Obviously, this procedure causes a serious risk of blocking 
decision-making. The only way to resolve this problem is through a precise and 
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strict definition of vital interests in the Constitution. The main problem with veto 
powers, however, is not their use but their preventive effect. 
Since all political elites involved are fully aware of the existence of the possibility 
of a veto, an issue with respect to which a veto can be used, will not even be put to 
vote. On the other hand, if there is an interest by the delegates of two constituent 
peoples to include certain bills to the voting procedure in the House of Peoples, 
which might be against the interest of the third constituent people then in order to 
stop it from even being brought to the discussion, the delegates who are against 
the bill will simply not come to the session whereby due to the absence of quorum 
is impossible for the session be held at all.
Furthermore, the Presidency is supposed to reach all decisions by consensus. 
However, a dissenting member of the Presidency may declare a Presidency de-
cision to be destructive for a vital interest of the entity from the territory from 
which he was elected, provided that he does so within three days of its adoption 
in the National Assembly of the RS in the case of the Serb member of the Presi-
dency or in the Bosniak or Croat caucuses in the House of Peoples of the FBH.    
The right to veto any decision at state and entity levels when the vital interest of 
one of the constituent peoples comes into question enables each ethnic group to 
prevent any attempt from the state to violate its autonomy. However, the criticism 
directed towards mutual veto is the possibility of a ‘tyranny of the minority’, or in 
the case of Bosnia, simple tyranny, because there are no minorities in the consti-
tutional sense- all three segments are equal constituents. Lijphart argues that mu-
tual veto will not lead to tyranny or immobilism because it will give each segment 
a sense of security and a mere recognition that the other segments have the same 
right and this will detract the political elite from the over-extensive use of veto. 
In Bosnia, however, the evidence shows otherwise. Thus, veto rights, one of the 
most important aspects of power-sharing arrangements can simultaneously have 
the most serious negative repercussions on the functioning of any institutional 
arrangements. The aim of veto-right usage in Bosnia has been to prevent the out-
voting of non-dominant groups at the level of parliament, cabinet and even the 
Presidency. One of the greater challenges to veto rights in Bosnia is the definition 
of a field of legislation and decision-making where such a veto right is applicable. 
As a result of this, very loose definitions and interpretations of the veto right in 
Bosnian context has allowed community representatives to block any decision 
and hence opening the door to its misuse and abuse. Therefore, a minority veto 
right in Bosnia potentially jeopardised the power sharing system because it has 
led to the entire obstruction of the decision-making process in the post-Dayton 
Bosnia. This indicates that vital national interest is one of the obstacles in the 
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Conclusion
The power-sharing framework used in this study attempts to serve two main pur-
poses. First, it provides insights into the theory of consociationalism as a power-
sharing approach in political science. Second, it tries to contribute to our under-
standing of the presence and relevance of this model in the Bosnian political 
system. 
The consociational framework emphasises the role of political elites in providing 
political stability and economic prosperity. The attention given to the political 
elites was based on the observation that much of what happens to the political 
system depends upon the role played by the elected and appointed political elites. 
Political elites may intensify the conflict within the society or may regulate it 
through development of institutions and supportive decision-making procedures. 
The relative conflict or cooperation that characterises their relations is contribu-
tory to the stability or the instability of the political system. 
Consociational power-sharing approach requires a grand coalition, proportional 
representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto as the main characteristics 
necessary for the state whose political system is based on the principles of con-
sociationalism to achieve its goals of political stability and economic prosperity.  
The explanatory power of the model applied in this paper is further improved by 
identifying the factors that are conducive to, or prohibitive of elite cooperation. 
These factors are: population size, balance of power among segments, a multi-
party system, segmental isolation, the nature of the extant social cleavages, over-
arching loyalties and a tradition of elite accommodation. These factors are quite 
helpful in explaining politics in the post-Dayton Bosnia. By virtue of the fact that 
Bosnia shares similar socio-economic and political problems of othercountries 
divided along ethnic lines, the framework used here should prove useful to the 
study of the politics of the developing areas in general.
This paper shows that all features of consociationalism exist in the post-Dayton 
Bosnian political system. However, grand coalitions are always made after the 
elections and mainly for the distribution of positions in the executive bodies of 
state apparatus and without any in-advance agreed strategic platform and goals 
to be achieved and accounted for. Proportionality has been mainly replaced with 
parity giving rise to imbalanced representation in state institutions. Segmental 
autonomy has been misconceived and veto power has been used to block all leg-
islation beneficial to the state.
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